China’s push into brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) is no longer an interesting research story; it is turning into an industrial strategy. While Western media tends to focus on Elon Musk’s Neuralink and a handful of U.S. pioneers, China is quietly stitching BCIs into its broader playbook for semiconductors, AI and medical devices.
If BCIs really do become the next major computing platform after smartphones and wearables, the countries that industrialize the tech first will shape the standards, the ethics – and the markets. China has clearly decided it does not intend to be a follower.
This piece looks at what’s actually happening in China’s BCI ecosystem, why it matters for global competition, and how Europe in particular needs to respond.
The news in brief
According to TechCrunch, China’s brain–computer interface sector is rapidly moving from lab research to commercial scale. A mix of invasive and non‑invasive BCI startups is emerging, helped by strong government policy, expanding clinical trials and rising investment.
TechCrunch highlights the perspective of entrepreneur Phoenix Peng, co‑founder of implant‑focused NeuroXess and founder of non‑invasive ultrasound BCI startup Gestala. He argues that BCIs will first gain traction in healthcare over the next three to five years, reaching a multibillion‑dollar market as devices get covered by national health insurance.
Policy is moving fast. In August 2025, China’s industry ministry and several other agencies published a national roadmap with technical targets for 2027 and a full supply chain by 2030. In December, at a Shenzhen expo, officials announced a dedicated brain science fund worth 11.6 billion yuan (around $165 million) to support BCI companies from research to commercialization.
On the market side, Chinese media figures cited by TechCrunch suggest BCI revenues could exceed 3.8 billion yuan (about $530 million) in 2025, with projections above 120 billion yuan by 2040.
Why this matters
The obvious winners are Chinese BCI startups and the domestic supply chain around them: chip makers, medical‑device manufacturers, AI firms, and hospitals that gain early access to subsidised trials. But the more interesting question is who loses if China succeeds.
For the moment, U.S. companies like Neuralink, Synchron and Paradromics dominate the narrative – the demos, the headlines, the TED‑style vision of mind‑controlled computers. China is betting on something less glamorous and more systemic: an integrated pipeline from basic neuroscience to reimbursed medical services, with state planning smoothing the path.
That approach could give Chinese firms three advantages:
- Scale in clinical data. Access to very large patient pools and centrally managed health insurance means trials can ramp quickly once regulators approve a device. For data‑hungry AI models that decode brain activity, volume and diversity of real‑world data are everything.
- Manufacturing cost and speed. China’s existing strength in semiconductors, sensors and medical hardware makes it easier to iterate on complex implants or ultrasound headsets and bring down unit costs.
- Policy alignment. When national and provincial authorities agree on reimbursement and technical standards early, hospitals and investors gain confidence that this isn’t just a science project.
The near‑term impact is mostly in healthcare: paralysis, stroke rehab, chronic pain, depression. But the strategic threat for Western players is longer‑term: if Chinese firms become the de facto standard for BCI hardware and protocols, they could define the interfaces through which future AI systems connect to human brains.
That flips the usual story. The West often worries about China catching up in AI software. In BCIs, China is trying to make sure it owns the hardware and the data layer that AI will plug into.
The bigger picture
China’s BCI surge sits at the crossroads of three trends.
First, it mirrors the country’s playbook in solar, batteries and now EVs: use industrial policy and manufacturing muscle to move a frontier technology from niche to mass‑market faster than others expect. In solar, that approach reshaped the global supply chain in under a decade. Neurotech won’t scale as fast, but the logic is familiar.
Second, it reflects how the AI race is spilling into hardware that captures data closer to the body – or, in this case, inside it. High‑bandwidth BCIs could one day become the richest possible “sensor” for AI systems, capturing thoughts, intentions and emotions rather than clicks and swipes. From China’s perspective, letting foreign companies dominate that interface would be strategically naïve.
Third, it fits a broader medical‑device push. Chinese firms are already increasingly competitive in imaging equipment, surgical robots and diagnostics. BCIs are a natural extension: heavily regulated, hardware‑centric, with strong export potential once clinical evidence and certifications are in place.
Compared with the U.S., the contrast is stark. America leads in breakthrough demonstrations and early FDA trials, but its fragmented insurance landscape makes reimbursement slow and uncertain. Startups have to fight payer by payer after regulatory approval. China, by contrast, can essentially “turn on” a market segment once the state has set reimbursement codes.
Historically, neurotech has gone through hype cycles: huge expectations in the 2000s around EEG headsets that did little more than measure focus; bold DARPA programs that took years to translate into real applications. The difference now is that AI decoding techniques have improved, and the geopolitical stakes are higher. For the first time, BCIs are being treated as a dual‑use strategic technology, not just a niche medical tool.
The European angle
For Europe, China’s BCI acceleration is both a warning and an opportunity.
On the one hand, EU players risk being squeezed between U.S. pioneers and Chinese scale. Europe has world‑class neuroscience and engineering – from research centres in Germany and France to clinical excellence in places like Switzerland and the Netherlands – but struggles to industrialise hardware‑heavy medical innovations. The EU Medical Device Regulation (MDR) has also made approvals slower and more expensive, especially for smaller startups.
On the other hand, Europe is ahead on the rules of the game. GDPR, the upcoming EU AI Act and debates around “mental privacy” give European institutions a credible platform to shape global norms for neuro‑data. If BCIs become mainstream, questions like: Who owns your brain data? Can insurers demand access? Can employers monitor attention? — will land first in Brussels and national parliaments.
Chinese regulators, TechCrunch notes, are already talking about aligning with international standards (IEC, ISO, FDA guidance) and tightening oversight of invasive devices and data. That’s partly a response to global expectations. Europe has leverage here: access to its market in exchange for compliance with robust safeguards.
European hospitals and device makers must now decide how comfortable they are partnering with Chinese BCI suppliers. Low‑cost hardware and ready‑made platforms will be tempting, especially for overstretched public systems. But data‑sovereignty and cybersecurity concerns will be even sharper than with conventional medtech, because this is literally about signals from inside people’s heads.
If Europe wants strategic autonomy in neurotech, it needs to treat BCIs less like a curiosity and more like an emerging infrastructure – with targeted funding, coordinated procurement and, crucially, a path to reimbursement.
Looking ahead
Over the next five years, expect three things.
1. A split between invasive and non‑invasive paths. Chinese regulators are likely to tighten rules around implants while giving faster approval tracks to “safer” modalities such as ultrasound or EEG‑based systems. That could make China a global leader in non‑invasive BCIs for chronic pain, stroke rehab and mental‑health indications, even if the most dramatic implant breakthroughs still come from the U.S.
2. Standards and geopolitics. As BCIs move toward international IEC/ISO standards, the key battle will be over details: data formats, safety thresholds, cybersecurity certification. These dry technical choices will determine interoperability and lock‑in. Expect China, the U.S. and the EU to push subtly different priorities that reflect their industrial and security interests.
3. Ethics moving from theory to practice. China is signalling stronger rules on informed consent and ethics review, but implementation will vary. In democratic systems, public backlash over any misuse of neuro‑data could quickly stall projects. Authoritarian systems face less public constraint but more international suspicion. Either way, early scandals – a hacked BCI device, abusive employer monitoring, or an unapproved experimental use – could trigger a regulatory snap‑back.
For investors and founders, BCIs will remain a high‑risk, long‑cycle bet. But the direction of travel is clear: what was once pure sci‑fi is slowly being bureaucratised into insurance codes and clinical protocols. The players that learn to navigate both the lab and the regulator’s office will win.
The bottom line
China is trying to industrialise brain–computer interfaces the way it did solar panels and batteries: with policy, manufacturing and capital moving in sync. That should worry anyone who assumes the future of neurotech will be written only in Silicon Valley labs.
For Europe, the choice is simple: either help define secure, ethical and interoperable BCI systems – and back its own champions – or end up importing the hardware and the rules from elsewhere. The next platform for human–AI interaction is being built. Who do you trust to own the interface to your brain?
